;-NRLF 


Colonel  Ephraim  Williams 

An  Appreciation 


BY 


WILLIAM   A.  PEW 


GIFT 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


COLONEL  EPHRAIM  WILLIAMS 


Colonel  Ephraim  Williams 

An  Appreciation 


BY 

WILLIAM  A.  PEW 

\\ 

LATE  MAJOR,  TL  8.  A.,  SOMETIME  COLONEL,  8TH  MASS.  INF.  U.  8.  V.,  AND 

MAJOR  GENERAL  RETIRED,  MASS.  NATIONAL  GUARD 


WITH  A  FOREWORD  BY 

GENERAL  LEONARD  WOOD 


WILLIAMSTOWN,  MASS. 

PRINTED  FOR  WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 

MDCCCCXIX 


THE  UNIVERSITY   PBE83,  CAMBRIDGE,  0.9.A. 


FOREWORD 

ENERAL  PEW,  in  his  "Appreciation"  of 
Colonel  Ephraim  Williams  of  the  Massachu 
setts  Colonial  Forces,  has  effectively  removed  an 
oft-repeated  charge  of  carelessness  and  want  of 
military  skill  and  precaution  from  the  record  of  a 
brave  soldier  who  fell  in  a  well  conducted  and,  so 
far  as  he  was  concerned,  bravely  fought  action. 

In  doing  this  he  has  gathered  and  arranged  in  a 
convincing  manner  much  information  concerning 
a  generally  misunderstood  action,  and  has  added 
materially  to  our  fund  of  information  concerning 
the  struggles  of  our  arms  during  the  Colonial 
period. 

General  Pew  has  done  this  with  the  same  thor 
oughness  and  efficiency  which  he  displayed  in  the 
operations  of  the  Spanish- American  War  and  in 
the  conduct  of  the  National  Guard  of  his  State 
since  that  war. 

The  "  Appreciation  "  is  an  act  of  tardy  justice  to 
one  who  well  and  gallantly  played  his  part  in  the 
bitter  struggle  between  British  and  French  for 
control  in  North  America. 

LEONARD   WOOD, 

Maj.  GenL,  U.  S.  A. 
CHICAGO,  ILL., 
June  10,  1919. 


M641488 


COLONEL  EPHRAIM  WILLIAMS 

An  Appreciation 

BY 

WILLIAM  A.  PEW 

Late  Maj.  U.  S.  A.,  Sometime  Colonel  8th  Mass.  Inf.  U.  S.  V.,  and 
Major  General  retired,  Mass.  National  Guard 

WHAT  do  we  know  of  Colonel  Ephraim 
Williams?  Is  it  possible  to  form  a  truer 
estimate  of  his  worth  as  a  soldier  than  history  has 
allowed  him? 

In  regard  to  his  private  life,  the  story  comes 
down  to  us,  that  he  left  his  small  fortune  as  a 
foundation  for  learning,  not  so  much  from  a  desire 
to  serve  his  fellow  men,  as  because  his  cousin  Eliza 
beth  had  refused  his  hand  and  all  his  worldly  goods. 
Investigation  discloses  two  cousins  Elizabeth.  At 
the  time  of  the  supposed  rejection  one  had  long 
since  married  and  for  some  years  had  been  dead. 
The  other  was  a  girl  who,  in  Williams'  lifetime, 
never  used  more  than  one  digit  to  tell  her  age.  To 
the  latter  he  left  his  silver  service  and  one  hundred 
dollars.  It  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  he  offered 
his  heart  either  to  a  lady  in  the  grave  or  to  one  in 
the  cradle. 

May  there  not  be  some  discrepancies  in  the  other 


8      COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

tradition,  that  he  was  a  soldier  of  little  capacity, 
fell  into  an  ambush  and  was  killed  as  a  result  of 
his  own  stupidity  in  not  sending  out  scouts  ? 

There  is  not  much  to  guide  us  as  we  read  con 
temporary  records  except  common  sense.  We 
must  remember  Colonel  Williams  was  not  only  a 
tried  soldier,  but  also  a  man  of  superior  intelli 
gence,  the  friend  of  men  in  high  places  of  his  day 
and  generation.  There  may  have  been  a  touch  of 
irony  in  the  man  who  called  the  Williams'  family 
the  ''River  Gods,"  but  it  showed  them  as  outstand 
ing  figures  among  their  fellows. 

The  fighting  between  the  English  and  the  French 
colonists  was  a  primitive  warfare.  The  country 
through  which  they  passed  was  in  itself  an  ambush. 
There  were  no  railways,  no  telegraph  or  telephone 
connections,  no  air  service,  only  paths  through  the 
forest,  few  and  rough.  Some  chances  had  to  be 
taken,  and  caution  was  associated  with  boldness 
but  never  with  temerity.  The  commanding  officer 
marched  at  the  head  of  his  troops  armed  with  a 
musket.  He  wore  his  sword  only  on  state  occa 
sions  or  when  he  had  his  portrait  painted.  In  the 
forest  forays  an  advance  guard  and  scouting  were 
the  only  protection.  It  is  no  more  to  be  thought 
that  Colonel  Williams  neglected  his  scouts,  than 
that  he  left  his  musket  hanging  over  the  mantel 
shelf. 

On   September  8,   1755,  Colonel  Williams  fell 


AN   APPRECIATION  9 

in  the  battle  known  as  "The  Bloody  Morning 
Scout."  Major  Ashley,  Captains  Porter,  Inger- 
soll,  and  Hawley  of  his  regiment  were  killed. 
General  Johnson  reported  that  all  the  chiefs  of  the 
Indians  in  the  detachment  were  slain.  None  of  the 
survivors  who  gathered  around  the  camp  fires  knew 
what  Williams  and  his  staff  had  in  mind.  Most 
of  them  had  been  caught  in  a  panic  and  had  run 
away  without  firing  their  pieces. 

No  one  on  our  side  who  was  actually  in  the  en 
gagement  has  left  a  narrative.  We  have  three 
sources  of  information,  —  the  camp  stories  current 
at  Fort  William  Henry,  the  official  report  of  Dies- 
kau,  and  the  tales  told  by  the  Mohawk  Indians  on 
their  way  home.  The  accepted  version  has  been 
largely  based  upon  the  report  of  deserters  too 
frightened  to  know  what  had  happened  and  eager 
to  cover  their  own  faint-heartedness. 

Dr.  Thomas  Williams,  writing  to  his  wife  under 
date  of  September  11,  said,  "The  certainty  is  not 
yet  known  because  those  brave  men,  who  stood 
fighting  for  our  dear  country,  perished  in  the  field 
of  battle.'*  It  was  easy  to  start  the  report  of  no 
service  of  security  or  information  and  therefore  a 
surprise.  Such  stories  shifted  the  blame  and  tended 
to  cover  up  "  the  awful  retreat  of  a  certain  gentle 
man  in  the  army  who  brought  up  the  rear.  Not 
withstanding  express  orders  of  our  dear  friend, 
Colonel  Williams,  that  no  man  retreat  upon  pain 


10    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

of  death,  this  gentleman  upon  first  fire  of  the 
enemy  gave  express  command  '  retreat,  retreat,' 
left  their  friends  (who  fought  valiantly  while  they 
lived)  to  fall  a  prey  into  the  hands  of  an  enemy 
whose  orders  were  most  shocking  that  ever  you 
heard,  neither  to  give  or  take  any  quarters." 

Most  of  our  troops  were  ill  clothed,  ill  fed,  dis 
contented,  insubordinate,  and  sickly.  Many  of  the 
officers  were  unfit  to  command.  It  was  a  hastily 
organized  force,  recently  assembled  at  Albany, 
which  after  several  reviews  before  Governor  Shirley 
and  General  Johnson  had  started  for  Crown  Point, 
and  reached  the  southern  end  of  Lake  George, 
where  they  had  remained  inactive  for  over  two 
weeks. 

Reverend  Charles  Chauncy  speaking  of  our  sol 
diers  said,  "  Many  of  our  young  men  were  here 
who  never  before  had  heard  a  gun  fired  in  anger." 
Seth  Pomroy  wrote  in  his  journal,  "A  number  of 
our  men  who  were  in  the  van  returned  the  fire  and 
fought  bravely,  but  many  of  our  men  in  the  rear 
fled." 

In  a  letter  to  Colonel  Israel  Williams,  dated 
September  9,  Pomroy  said:  "There  was  not  above 
one  hundred  of  our  men  that  fired  at  all.  But 
they  did  with  undaunted  bravery  and  well,  and 
answered  the  character  of  English." 

Perez  Marsh  was  surgeon's  mate  in  the  Third 
Bay  State  Regiment  and  great  was  his  admiration 


AN   APPRECIATION  11 

for  Ephraim  Williams.  He  thought  of  him  as  a 
rich  man  qualified  to  pass  all  tests  likely  to  be  im 
posed  at  the  gates  of  heaven.  He  took  pride  in 
hearing  him  called  one  of  the  "  River  Gods,"  and 
in  telling  how  the  Governor  and  magnates  at  Bos 
ton  listened  to  his  advice  and  thought  it  wise,  or 
how  he  persuaded  with  sweet  reasonableness  the 
General  Court  to  incline  his  way. 

Marsh  wrote  to  his  wife  September  26.  The 
story  of  a  surprise  had  now  become  well  crystal 
lized  by  retelling,  and  Marsh  had  heard  many 
explanations  of  the  disaster.  The  Indians  who 
constituted  Williams'  advance  guard  had  left  for 
their  homes  in  central  New  York  two  days  after 
the  battle.  No  survivor  of  the  advance  guard  re 
mained  at  Fort  William  Henry  to  tell  what  actu 
ally  took  place  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight. 
Marsh  said  in  his  letter :  "  The  most  astonishing 
thing  that  happened  was  that  Colonel  Williams 
should  go  three  miles  from  the  camp  with  twelve 
hundred  men,  expecting  an  attack  every  minute, 
or  at  least  that  it  was  quite  probable,  and  yet  keep 
no  scouts  out.  I  have  often  heard  him  speak  of 
the  very  thing  and  the  danger  of  marching  without 
it.  That  Colonel  Williams  should  neglect  this  and 
give  the  enemy  the  best  advantage  you  can  con 
ceive  of  is  very  remarkable." 

The  above  quotation  is  interesting  as  showing 
the  beginning  of  a  tradition.  The  writer  was  swept 


12    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

into  a  belief  in  Williams'  incompetency  by  an 
unconscious  sympathy  with  his  surroundings. 
Marsh  was  right.  It  was  remarkable  if  it  hap 
pened  that  way. 

The  story  of  the  Battle  of  Lake  George  is  usu 
ally  told  somewhat  as  follows:  The  command  of 
the  expedition  against  Crown  Point  in  the  year 
1755  was  given  to  General  William  Johnson. 
Johnson  was  no  soldier,  but  had  great  influence 
with  the  Indians.  During  the  late  summer  he  as 
sembled  a  force  of  New  England  militia  at  Albany. 
They  were  mostly  farmers,  except  a  few  Indian 
fighters  who  had  served  under  Colonel  Williams 
on  the  Massachusetts  border.  These  were  joined 
by  a  party  of  a  few  hundred  Mohawks.  A  part 
of  Johnson's  force  was  encamped  at  Lake  George, 
where  it  was  engaged  in  building  boats.  The 
remainder  was  at  Fort  Edwards  on  the  Hudson, 
forwarding  supplies.  While  the  English  prepara 
tions  were  proceeding  tardily  Dieskau,  commander 
of  the  French  force,  was  not  inactive.  He  was 
a  brilliant  soldier,  a  pupil  of  Marshal  Saxe,  and 
endowed  with  great  energy.  With  a  picked  force 
he  came  down  Lake  Champlain  and  advanced  be 
tween  the  two  English  forces.  On  the  morning  of 
September  8  General  Johnson  ordered  a  recon 
naissance  in  force  under  Colonel  Williams  and  the 
Indian  chief  Hendrick.  They  fell  into  an  ambush 
prepared  by  Dieskau.  Both  were  killed  and  their 


AN   APPRECIATION  13 

command  defeated.  The  French  followed  up  their 
advantage  and  closely  pursued,  hoping  to  enter 
Fort  William  Henry  with  the  fugitives.  They  met 
a  hot  reception  at  the  fort,  where,  after  fighting 
several  hours,  they  withdrew,  leaving  their  general 
severely  wounded  and  a  prisoner  of  the  English. 
As  the  French  retreated  they  fell  in  with  a  party 
coming  from  Fort  Edwards,  whereby  they  suf 
fered  farther  losses.  The  victory  at  Lake  George 
inspired  the  Colonists  with  a  new  confidence.  In 
this  battle  Lyman,  Putnam,  and  Stark,  names  to 
become  illustrious,  received  their  first  baptism  of 
fire.  General  Johnson  was  made  a  baronet  and 
received  a  grant  of  five  thousand  pounds. 

Fort  William  Henry  was  situated  at  the  south 
ern  end  of  Lake  George.  It  was  connected  by  a 
wagon  road  with  Fort  Edwards  on  the  upper 
reaches  of  the  Hudson.  On  the  evening  of  Sep 
tember  7  General  Johnson  knew  that  a  large  body 
of  French  and  Indians  had  landed  at  South  Bay 
on  Lake  Champlain,  and  proceeded  to  the  wood 
road  connecting  Forts  Edwards  and  William 
Henry.  Their  mission  was  evidently  an  attack  on 
one  of  the  two  forts.  There  was  nothing  else  to  do. 

General  Johnson  supposed  that  the  enemy 
would  make  an  attack  upon  Fort  Edwards.  Ac 
cordingly  he  detailed  Colonel  Williams  with  about 
one  thousand  soldiers  and  two  hundred  Indians 
to  march,  as  he  said,  "  in  order  to  catch  the  enemy 


14    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

in  their  retreat  from  the  other  camp,  either  as 
victors,  or  defeated  in  their  design." 

Williams  marched  in  the  morning  with  a  division 
of  five  hundred  men.  His  Indians  were  not  ready. 
As  an  eyewitness  described  it,  "  The  Indians  some 
afore,  some  in  the  middle,  and  some  in  the  rear, 
and  so  on  throughout  as  they  got  ready  to  march." 
After  marching  a  couple  of  miles,  Williams  halted, 
threw  out  march  outposts  and  waited  until  he  was 
joined  by  the  remainder  of  his  detachment.  He 
was  ready  to  resume  his  march  about  ten  o'clock. 
His  advance  guard  then  consisted  of  all  the  In 
dians  under  the  command  of  Chief  Hendrick.  His 
main  body  consisted  of  about  one  thousand  men. 

The  weather  was  pleasant  and  the  wind  from 
the  south.  No  musketry  fire  had  been  heard  from 
the  direction  of  Fort  Edwards. 

Hoyt  in  his  "Antiquarian  Researches"  reports 
the  following  story  by  a  survivor:  "  During  this  halt 
flankers  were  thrown  out  on  the  right  and  left,  in 
the  thick  woods,  and  while  in  this  position  a  drove 
of  deer  rushed  down  the  valley  and  passed  between 
the  men,  indicating  great  fright.  No  suspicions, 
however,  were  entertained  that  they  were  frightened 
by  the  enemy." 

At  Chancellorsville,  when  Jackson  turned  our 
right  flank  and  was  bearing  down  on  the  llth 
Corps,  his  advance  was  preceded  by  a  flight  of 
wild  animals  which  had  been  startled  by  his  de- 


AN   APPRECIATION  15 

ployed  line.  I  have  seen  the  same  thing  in  a 
manoeuvre  through  the  thickets  of  Chickamauga. 
A  drove  of  frightened  deer  rushing  north  along  the 
wood  road  could  have  had  but  one  meaning  for  two 
old  fighters  like  Williams  and  Hendrick.  It  was 
probably  at  this  time  Hendrick  said  to  Williams, 
"  I  smell  indians."  It  was  their  last  interview. 
When  the  advance  was  continued  Williams  was 
at  the  head  of  the  main  body  and  Hendrick  at  the 
head  of  the  advance  guard.  Hendrick  was  a 
Mohegan  who  had  been  adopted  into  the  Mohawk 
tribe.  He  had  spent  over  forty  years  scouting  and 
on  Indian  raids.  That  they  had  heard  no  mus 
ketry  from  the  direction  of  Fort  Edwards,  and 
that  their  outposts  were  rushed  by  frightened  deer 
must  have  been  notice  to  Williams  and  Hendrick 
that  they  were  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy. 
Their  meeting  in  the  next  half  hour  could  not  have 
come  as  a  surprise  to  either  of  them. 

It  was  proper  that  the  Indians  should  form  the 
advance  guard.  They  were  the  trained  scouts  of 
the  army. 

General  Johnson  said  in  his  official  report  that 
after  this  halt,  "  Our  party  then  marched  forward, 
the  indians  leading  the  van,  one  of  the  enemy's 
muskets  by  accident  went  off,  which  alarmed  our 
people  and  discovered  the  enemy,  who  immediately 
began  their  fire  on  our  indians,  who  finding  the 
enemy  on  all  sides  retreated  to  Colonel  Williams 


16    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

who  was  at  some  small  distance.  The  engagement 
then  began  on  both  sides.  The  Indians  and  the 
van  of  our  people  sustained  the  warmest  fire  and 
amongst  them  was  the  greatest  slaughter.  Whilst 
the  rest  of  our  troops  were  marching  up  to  support 
them,  the  enemy  who  were  much  superior  in  num 
ber  began  to  spread  themselves  in  order  to  sur 
round  us.  Our  officers  then  thought  it  prudent  to 
retreat  toward  the  camp  and  our  men  fled  that 
way." 

It  has  been  repeatedly  said  that  Williams'  ad 
vance  guard  was  not  preceded  by  scouts.  M.  de 
Vaudreuil,  the  Governor  of  Canada,  in  his  official 
report  under  date  of  September  25  said,  in  speak 
ing  of  Baron  Dieskau's  advance,  "When  he  was 
about  a  league  from  the  enemy's  camp,  his  scouts 
brought  him  in  two  Englishmen,  who  told  him  that 
a  large  body  of  English  and  Indians  were  follow 
ing  them."  It  would  seem  from  this  report  that 
Williams'  advance  guard  was  preceded  by  some 
sort  of  a  scouting  party.  Who,  otherwise,  were  the 
captives  who  gave  accurate  information?  It  is  not 
to  be  supposed  that  they  were  two  Englishmen 
taking  a  casual  morning  stroll.  Their  position  and 
information  indicate  they  were  members  of  a 
patrol. 

After  reading  all  the  contemporary  literature 
bearing  on  this  fight,  it  is  evident  Colonel  Williams 
fell  fighting  like  a  gallant  soldier.  That  he  was 


AN  APPRECIATION  17 

surprised  is  not  justified  in  any  narrative  of  the 
facts  told  by  those  who  draw  this  conclusion.  He 
knew  the  French  were  ten  miles  from  Fort  Wil 
liam  Henry  the  night  before.  His  ears  must  have 
told  him  that  nothing  had  occurred  in  the  nature 
of  an  attack  against  Fort  Edwards  up  to  ten 
o'clock  that  morning.  Therefore  the  French  were 
moving  against  Fort  William  Henry.  This  was 
probably  in  his  mind  when  he  halted  and  reorgan 
ized  his  force.  It  is  quite  impossible  to  accept  the 
statement  that  the  frightened  deer  roused  no  sus 
picions  among  his  two  hundred  Indians. 

Williams'  plan  must  have  been  to  use  the  Indians 
to  beat  up  the  French,  and  under  cover  of  this  ad 
vance  guard  use  his  main  body  as  circumstances 
required.  His  formations  were  correct.  If  the 
Indians  ran  into  an  ambush  that  was  their  mission. 
Advanced  guards  are  pushed  forward  to  find  such 
things.  There  can  be  no  doubt  Dieskau  did  plan 
an  ambush,  but,  as  will  appear  later  from  his  re 
port,  it  was  unsuccessful  either  because  discovered 
by  the  Mohawks  or  disclosed  by  the  treachery  of 
the  Iroquois. 

In  regard  to  Williams'  leadership,  the  common 
estimate  that  he  lacked  military  capacity  is  wrong. 
What  he  attempted  was  well  planned.  Its  execu 
tion  depended  upon  the  character  of  the  sol 
diers.  They  were  mostly  without  military  training. 
Those  within  the  sphere  of  his  personal  influence 


18    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

responded  to  his  example  and  fought  bravely. 
These  may  have  been  the  few  he  had  trained  in 
previous  years  at  forts  Coleraine,  Vernon,  and 
Massachusetts.  If  Pomroy's  estimate  is  correct 
only  about  one  hundred  of  our  men  were  depend 
able.  After  Williams  was  killed  these  fell  back 
before  the  attack  of  the  regulars.  Considering  the 
character  of  the  country  and  the  forces  involved, 
Williams'  plan  of  advance  was  superior  to  that  of 
his  opponent,  Baron  Dieskau. 

Baron  Dieskau's  order  for  his  march  and  attack 
on  the  morning  of  September  8  reads:  "When  the 
army  will  march  in  three  columns,  the  order  of 
battle  that  has  been  laid  down  will  be  followed,  and 
one  column  will  be  kept  at  least  one  hundred  paces 
distant  from  the  other,  in  order  that  the  French 
battalions  have  room  to  form  themselves  into  a 
line  of  battle  —  when  so  directed. 

"  Should  the  army  march  in  three  columns,  and 
it  be  necessary  to  fight  the  enemy  in  that  order,  in 
the  forest,  then  Mr.  de  Saint  Pierre  will  make  a 
most  vigorous  attack  with  the  Indians  and  Mr. 
de  Repentigny's  corps.  .  .  .  He  will  be  sustained 
by  the  three  columns;  that  of  the  right  marching 
Canadian  fashion,  will  go  beyond  the  enemy,  in 
order  to  attack  his  flank. 

"  The  left  column  will  do  the  same  on  its  side, 
and  the  column  consisting  of  the  battalions  of 


AN  APPRECIATION  19 

France,  will  march  directly  against  the  enemy  and 
attack  in  columns,  unless  it  be  ordered  to  form  a 
line  which  will  not  fail  to  happen,  if  the  ground 
allow  it;  these  battalions  will  make  their  attack 
as  regular  troops  ought  to  do,  without  breaking 
and  scattering." 

No  mention  is  made  of  an  advance  guard.  Un 
doubtedly  he  made  use  of  patrols,  as  he  knew  of 
Williams'  approach  and  had  captured  two  English 
scouts. 

M.  de  Vaudreuil,  the  Governor  of  Canada,  com 
menting  upon  this  formation,  says,  "  Each  column 
was  about  thirty  paces  apart,  so  that  the  Canadians 
and  Indians  were  obliged  to  advance  through  the 
woods  and  on  the  mountains  to  preserve  that  order 
of  march  which  seriously  fatigued  them." 

The  object  of  this  formation  was  to  facilitate  a 
rapid  deployment  and  to  envelop  the  enemy's 
flanks  before  he  could  form  line.  This  formation 
was  tried  by  General  Abercromby  in  his  advance 
against  Ticonderoga,  and  resulted  in  great  confu 
sion.  Forbes  used  it  in  his  approach  against  Fort 
Duquesne. 

Up  to  the  beginning  of  the  battle  the  advantage 
of  leadership  was  with  the  English. 

Just  before  meeting  the  enemy  Dieskau  halted 
his  center  column,  which  consisted  of  French  regu 
lars,  and  advanced  his  two  flank  columns.  This 
constituted  the  ambush. 


20    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

We  have  two  plans  drawn  soon  after  the  battle. 
Reverend  Samuel  Chandler,  who  was  a  clergyman 
at  Gloucester,  Massachusetts,  joined  as  chaplain 
the  Essex  County  Regiment  sent  to  the  relief  of 
General  Johnson.  In  his  diary  under  date  of 
October  17,  1755,  he  says:  "The  position  of  the 
enemy  when  they  met  Colonel  Williams 


The  regulars  in  a  body  and  the  Indians  and  the 
Canadians  in  the  flank  in  two  half  moons." 

Samuel  Blodget,  who  was  a  sutler  at  Fort  Wil 
liam  Henry,  published  a  pictorial  representation 
of  the  Bloody  Morning  Scout  and  the  attack  upon 
Fort  William  Henry.  His  accompanying  narra 
tive  is  interesting  as  a  description  of  the  ground. 
He  describes  the  land  on  Williams'  left  as  covered 
with  a  thatch  growth  descending  to  a  ravine.  On 
his  right  was  an  eminence  covered  with  rocks,  trees, 
and  shrubs.  The  French  formation  was  that  of  a 
hook,  with  their  left  farther  advanced  than  their 
right. 

The  impression  given  by  these  two  drawings  is 
that  the  French  formed  a  cul  de  sac  into  which  the 


AN  APPRECIATION  21 

English  advanced,  whereupon  the  two  flank  col 
umns  closed  in  upon  the  English  and  opened  fire. 
Such  a  proceeding  would  have  been  as  dangerous 
to  the  French  as  to  the  English.  There  was  noth 
ing  to  prevent  the  fire  of  one  French  column  de 
stroying  the  other. 

Dr.  Timothy  Dwight,  President  of  Yale  Col 
lege,  went  over  this  ground.  His  description  in 
"Travels  in  New  England  and  New  York"  is 
probably  more  accurate.  He  says:  "Colonel  Wil 
liams  met  the  enemy  at  Rocky  Brook,  four  miles 
from  Lake  George.  Dieskau  had  been  informed 
of  his  approach  by  his  scouts;  and  arranged  his 
men,  .  .  .  extending  his  line  on  both  sides  of  the 
road  in  the  form  of  a  half  moon." 

Dieskau's  scheme  was  to  catch  Williams'  main 
column  before  they  had  a  chance  to  deploy.  This 
half -moon  formation  would  give  him  a  superiority 
of  fire.  It  was  to  guard  against  such  tactics  that 
Williams  employed  his  Indians  as  an  advance 
guard. 

John  Burk,  the  captain  lieutenant  in  Williams' 
own  company,  who  was  not  in  the  fight,  wrote  to 
his  wife  under  date  of  September  11:  "On  the  7th 
inst.  our  Indians  discovered  the  track  of  a  large 
body  of  the  enemy  East  of  us.  On  the  eighth  Colonel 
Williams  with  a  detachment  of  one  thousand 
strong,  marched  in  pursuit,  or  to  make  discovery. 
They  marched  in  the  road  3  miles  south,  and 


22    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

being  discovered  by  the  enemy,  (as  we  are  told  by 
the  French  General  who  is  taken  by  us )  were  way 
laid  by  eighteen  hundred  French  and  Indians.  The 
French  lay  on  one  side  of  the  road  on  rising  ground ; 
the  Indians  on  the  other  side  in  a  swamp.  Part  of 
the  French  were  regular  troops:  these  lay  south. 
Their  scheme  was  to  let  our  men  march  quite  to 
the  south  end  of  the  ambush,  the  regular  troops  to 
give  the  first  fire,  then  all  to  fire  and  rush  out ;  which 
if  they  had  done  they  would  have  cut  our  men  all 
to  pieces.  But  the  general  says  that  a  beady  In 
dian,  who  was  very  eager,  fired  as  soon  as  they 
entered  the  ambush." 

In  his  official  report  to  the  Minister  of  War, 
Dieskau  describes  what  he  intended  and  what  oc 
curred.  "  Before  quitting  Montreal,  I  had  already 
various  reasons  for  suspecting  the  fidelity  of  the 
domiciliated  Iroquois  both  of  Sault  St.  Louis 
and  the  Lake  of  the  Two  Mountains,  whose 
number  exceeded  300  composing  half  of  the  In 
dians  that  had  been  given  to  me.  I  represented 
it  repeatedly  to  M.  de  Vaudreuil,  who  would  never 
admit  it,  but  scarcely  had  I  arrived  at  Fort  St. 
Frederic,  than  I  had  occasion  to  furnish  him  still 
stronger  proofs  thereof. 

"  For  more  than  fifteen  days  that  I  was  encamped 
under  that  fort,  I  encountered  nothing  but  diffi 
culties  from  the  Indians ;  those  who  were  good,  were 
spoiled  by  the  Iroquois.  Never  was  I  able  to  ob- 


AN   APPRECIATION  23 

tain  from  them  a  faithful  scout;  at  one  time  they 
refused  to  make  any;  at  another  time,  seeming  to 
obey  me,  they  set  forth,  but  when  a  few  leagues 
from  the  camp,  they  sent  back  the  Frenchmen  I 
had  associated  with  them,  and  used  to  return  within 
a  few  days  without  bringing  me  any  intelligence. 
Such  has  been  the  conduct  of  the  Indians,  caused 
by  the  Iroquois.  My  letters  from  Fort  St.  Fred 
eric  to  M.  de  Vaudreuil  and  M.  Bigot,  suffi 
ciently  develop  the  particulars  of  their  mischievous 
intrigues. 

"  On  the  following  day,  the  8th  of  September,  I 
commenced  my  march.  About  ten  of  the  clock, 
after  having  proceeded  five  leagues,  the  scouts  re 
ported  to  me  that  they  had  seen  a  large  body  of 
troops  on  their  way  to  the  fort,  which  news  was 
confirmed  by  a  prisoner  taken  at  the  time.  They 
consisted  of  one  thousand  men  or  more,  that  had 
left  the  camp  to  reinforce  the  fort.  I  immediately 
made  my  arrangement,  ordered  the  Indians  to 
throw  themselves  into  the  woods,  to  allow  the 
enemy  to  pass,  so  as  to  attack  them  in  the  rear, 
whilst  the  Canadians  took  them  on  the  flank,  and 
I  should  wait  for  them  in  front  with  the  regular 
troops. 

"  This  was  the  moment  of  treachery.  The  Iro 
quois,  who  were  on  the  left,  showed  themselves  be 
fore  the  time  and  did  not  fire.  The  Abenakis  who 


24    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

occupied  the  right,  seeing  themselves  discovered, 
alone  with  a  few  Canadians  attacked  the  enemy  in 
front  and  put  them  to  flight.  I  immediately  pre 
pared  to  join  them,  in  order  to  accompany  the  fugi 
tives  into  their  camp,  though  still  more  than  a 
league  off. 

"  Meanwhile  the  Iroquois  collected  on  a  hill,  un 
willing  to  advance.  Some  of  them  even  wanted  to 
force  the  Abenakis  to  release  three  Mohocks  whom 
they  had  captured  at  the  first  encounter.  I  am 
ignorant  of  the  result  of  that  quarrel  but  the 
Abenakis,  seeing  the  Iroquois  immovable,  halted 
also,  and  the  Canadians  seeing  the  retreat  of  the 
one  and  the  other,  were  thereby  intimidated." 

There  is  another  version  of  the  charge  of  Iro 
quois  treachery  which  was  told  by  the  Mohawks  on 
their  way  home.  I  find  two  references  to  this  story 
in  contemporary  correspondence. 

Pownall  in  a  letter  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  dated 
New  York,  September  20,  says :  "  There  are  many 
further  accounts  brought  down  from  Albany  by 
the  Schippers  of  which  the  following  is  one.  That 
when  the  French  Indians  were  for  standing  aside 
and  letting  the  English  and  French  decide  the 
quarrel,  old  Hendrick  declared  for  war  and  fired 
the  first  shot."  The  other  is  in  a  news  letter  writ 
ten  by  Daniel  Dulaney  at  Annapolis,  December  9. 
He  says :  "  I  am  but  just  returned  from  New  York, 
whither  I  went  to  accompany  our  Governor  at  his 


AN   APPRECIATION  25 

request,  and  by  all  that  I  could  collect  there,  the 
New  England  people  did  not  behave  so  well  as 
might  have  been  wished,  and  nothing  but  the 
cowardice  of  the  enemy  saved  them.  Mr.  Johnson 
having  received  intelligence  that  a  large  body  of 
the  enemy  were  in  motion,  sent  out  a  party  of  one 
thousand  or  twelve  hundred  men  under  the  com 
mand  of  the  Colonels  Williams  and  Whiting  to 
reconnoitre  them.  The  enemy,  also  having  intelli 
gence  of  the  march  of  this  body  of  men,  formed  in 
an  ambuscade,  into  which  our  people  would  have 
inevitably  fallen,  had  it  not  been  for  the  following 
extraordinary  accident.  Among  this  party  under 
the  command  of  Williams  and  Whiting  were  sev 
eral  of  the  Mohocks,  as  there  were  of  the  Potme- 
wagoes  among  the  French.  When  our  Indians 
who  were  in  front  were  within  gunshot  of  the 
French  Indians,  they  discovered  themselves  by  ris 
ing  up,  and  discharging  their  pieces  in  the  air  in 
token  of  friendship  to  our  Indians,  and  imme 
diately  proposed  to  them  to  withdraw  them 
selves  from  the  English  and  French  troops,  and 
leave  it  to  them  to  decide  their  own  quarrel.  To 
this  proposition  many  of  the  Mohocks  began  to 
listen,  when  old  Hendrick,  fearing  the  consequence, 
if  this  treaty  was  not  interrupted,  immediately  shot 
one  of  the  French  Indians,  and  thus  the  engage 
ment  began." 

When  a  charge  of  treachery  is  made  we  look  for 


26    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

an  instigator  and  his  motive.  The  reports  of 
Pownall  and  Dulaney  say  that  Hendrick  broke  up 
the  parley  and  started  the  fighting.  It  is  more 
likely  the  fighting  was  started  by  a  French  officer, 
serving  with  the  Indians.  We  would  gain  much 
by  detaching  the  French  Indians,  who  greatly  out 
numbered  ours.  It  is  quite  probable  that  Williams 
and  Hendrick  were  the  instigators  of  this  plot, 
hoping  thereby  to  discourage  the  remaining  In 
dians  and  Canadians  and  then  surround  the  small 
body  of  French  regulars  and  defeat  them  with  their 
open-order  skirmish  formation.  Dieskau  seems  to 
have  run  up  against  a  modern  trick  like  the  Ger 
man  propaganda  before  the  Italian  debacle.  That 
the  scheme  was  partially  successful  appears  in 
Dieskau's  report.  Unfortunately  Williams  and 
Hendrick  were  shot.  After  their  fall  a  panic  en 
sued,  during  which  a  few  hundred  regulars  drove 
our  force  back  to  Fort  William  Henry. 

Pomroy  told  Dr.  D wight  that  just  before  the 
Mohawks  left  Fort  William  Henry  they  were  ha 
rangued  by  Hendrick.  He  said  he  did  not  under 
stand  a  word  of  the  language  but  was  more  deeply 
affected  by  this  speech  than  by  any  other  he  had 
ever  heard.  It  is  possible  Hendrick  was  disclosing 
to  his  followers  his  plan  of  detaching  the  Iroquois. 
Both  Mohawk  and  Iroquois  were  members  of  the 
same  confederacy.  They  were  never  anxious  to 
fight  each  other.  The  Iroquois  occupied  the  ad- 


AN   APPRECIATION  27 

vanced  left  of  Dieskau's  position  and  were  the  first 
enemy  encountered  by  the  Mohawks.  Some  sort 
of  powwow  preceded  the  fight.  This  seems  to  dis 
pose  of  the  story  of  a  surprise  and  successful 
ambush. 

It  is  certain  that  something  occurred  between  the 
Iroquois  and  the  Mohawks  which  justified  the  let 
ter  of  Dieskau  to  the  Governor  of  Canada,  in  which 
he  said:  "  I  am  defeated;  my  detachment  is  routed; 
a  number  of  men  are  killed  and  thirty  or  forty  are 
prisoners,  as  I  am  told.  I  and  M.  Bernier,  my  Aid 
de  Camp,  are  among  the  latter,  I  have  received  for 
my  share,  four  gunshot  wounds,  one  of  which  is  mor 
tal.  I  owe  this  misfortune  to  the  treachery  of  the 
Iroquois.  Our  affair  was  well  begun,  but  as  soon 
as  the  Iroquois  perceived  some  Mohawks,  they 
came  to  a  dead  halt,  the  Abenakis  and  other  In 
dians  continued  some  time,  but  disappeared  also 
by  degrees ;  this  disheartened  the  Canadians,  so  that 
I  found  myself  with  the  French  troops  engaged 
almost  alone.  I  bore  the  attack,  believing  that  I 
might  rally  the  Canadians  and  perhaps  the  In 
dians,  in  which  I  did  not  succeed.  The  Regulars 
received  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  were 
almost  cut  to  pieces.  I  prophesied  to  you,  Sir,  that 
the  Iroquois  would  play  some  scurvy  trick;  it  is 
unfortunate  for  me  that  I  am  such  a  good  prophet." 

This  charge  of  a  "  scurvy  trick "  implies  some 
thing  more  than  that  a  crazy  Indian  disclosed  the 


28    COLONEL   EPHRAIM   WILLIAMS 

ambush  by  shooting  in  a  moment  of  excitement. 
What  actually  took  place  can  never  be  known.  It 
seems  probable  that  Williams  and  Hendrick,  who 
were  friends  at  Stockbridge,  formed  some  scheme 
which,  although  not  thoroughly  successful  in  the 
morning  fight,  did  frustrate  the  plans  of  the  enemy, 
and  contributed  materially  to  our  victory  later  by 
sowing  the  seeds  of  distrust  between  the  French 
and  their  Indian  allies. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  those  who  shared  Wil 
liams'  counsel  fell  beside  him,  and  the  reputation 
of  a  brave  soldier  has  been  dimmed  by  the  tongues 
of  those  who  were  running  away  while  he  was  in 
the  midst  of  battle. 

A  careful  survey  of  what  evidence  remains  seems 
to  prove  beyond  question  that  Williams  took  every 
reasonable  precaution  to  protect  his  march.  His 
advance  was  regular  and  in  proper  form.  He  was 
not  surprised  and  did  not  fall  into  an  ambush. 
Whether  the  Iroquois  succumbed  to  propaganda 
or  were  simply  unwilling  to  fight,  Williams  was 
pushing  forward  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation 
when  he  fell.  With  his  death  all  energy  disap 
peared  and  hope  of  victory  vanished. 

Ephraim  Williams  was  one  of  New  England's 
fine  and  sturdy  sons.  He  was  tall  and  well  pro 
portioned,  in  many  ways  resembling  Washington, 
but  handsomer  and  more  at  ease  in  society.  An 


AN   APPRECIATION  29 

ideal  officer,  punctilious  in  dress  and  deportment, 
solicitous  in  his  care  for  officers  and  men  (always 
struggling  for  a  full  complement  of  supplies  which 
the  General  Court  voted  writh  reluctance  and  which 
were  tardy  in  forthcoming),  demanding  much  of 
subordinates,  but  bearing  his  full  share  in  every 
hardship  and  privation.  He  served  his  country 
and  his  fellow  men,  feared  God,  and  honored  his 
king.  Williams  College  is  happy  in  bearing  his 
name.  When  we  speak  it,  let  us  remember  the 
greatness  of  its  founder  was  in  service.  As  Phillips 
Brooks  said  in  regard  to  Washington:  "  Let  us  cul 
tivate  reverence  for  greatness.  Teach  it  to  our 
children.  Cultivate  a  perception  of  it.  The  double 
blessing  of  pattern  and  power." 


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